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TIME TO DEFINE ‘THE CORNERSTONE OF PUBLIC 
 ORDER LEGISLATION’: THE ELEMENTS OF  
OFFENSIVE CONDUCT AND LANGUAGE UNDER  
THE SUMMARY OFFENCES ACT 1988 (NSW)* 
 
 
JULIA QUILTER** AND LUKE MCNAMARA*** 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
This article addresses a contradiction that has long been at the heart of the 
criminal law concerned with ‘public order’. Although crimes such as offensive 
conduct and offensive language are amongst the most frequently prosecuted 
offences in Australia, their legal nature is poorly understood and rarely the subject 
of judicial scrutiny or academic explanation. In the context of ongoing 
controversy over whether such offences have a legitimate place on the statute 
books, we confront this oversight. This article draws on the High Court of 
Australia’s decision in He Kaw Teh v The Queen1 to lay out a methodology for 
construing the elements of a statutory offence, and then employs this approach to 
produce a recommended interpretation of the elements of sections 4 and 4A of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). 
  
                                                 
*  This article has its origins in our work as criminal law teachers, and in our respective lead contributions to 
the public order chapters of criminal law textbooks: Donna Spears, Julia Quilter and Clive Harfield, 
Criminal Law for Common Law States (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2011) ch 8; David Brown et al, 
Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New South Wales 
(Federation Press, 5th ed, 2011) ch 8. We would like to thank our teaching colleagues, students and co-
authors for the many stimulating conversations we have had over the years on the topic of public order 
offences generally, and offensive conduct/language laws in particular.  
**  Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Wollongong and Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Law, 
University of New South Wales. 
***  Professor, School of Law, University of Wollongong and Visiting Professorial Fellow, Faculty of Law, 
University of New South Wales. 
1  (1985) 157 CLR 523 (‘He Kaw Teh’). 




Brown et al have observed that: 
The cornerstone of public order legislation is usually a provision that permits police 
to act where behaviour in a public place is regarded as offensive, insulting, abusive 
or indecent. Such provisions are inevitably vague and open-ended, with the 
characterisation of the behaviour left to the discretion of the police in the first 
instance, and subsequently to the discretion of magistrates.2 
In New South Wales (‘NSW’), the ‘cornerstone’ is provided by sections 4 
and 4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). Certainly the characteristics 
of vagueness and open-endedness, and susceptibility to discretion, to which 
Brown et al refer, are evident in the definitions of offensive conduct and 
offensive language. The legitimacy of these laws, and equivalent laws in other 
jurisdictions,3 has long been a topic of debate, and appropriately so.4 More than 
40 years ago, Frank Walker MP (later Attorney-General of NSW) observed, in 
relation to the Summary Offences Bill 1970 (NSW): 
One of the most arbitrary and dangerous aspects of the bill is the proliferation of 
vague, uncertain dragnet offences such as are to be found in … the definition of 
unseemly words and later in the bill in provisions dealing with offensive 
behaviour. 
Any practising criminal lawyer will say that such terminology operates only to 
give the widest possible latitude to the police and the magistrates, and thereby 
constitutes a serious blow to the liberty of the citizen to be free from arbitrary 
arrest and arbitrary prosecution. I submit that this vague terminology is 
jurisprudentially unsound. Certainty is the very essence of the criminal law. Every 
man has the right to know whether his actions at a given time are or are not 
criminal. Sweeping, dragnet terminology means that a particular act will be legal 
or illegal according to the subjective opinions of the police officers and 
magistrates involved.5 
A decade later, Doreen McBarnet coined the phrase ‘ideology of triviality’ to 
capture the air of relative unimportance that pervades the high volume lower 
courts of the criminal justice system.6 A related dimension of McBarnet’s 
                                                 
2  David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New 
South Wales (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2011) 752. 
3  See Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 7(1)(a) (behave ‘in a disorderly or offensive manner’), (1)(c) 
(use of ‘offensive language’); Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) ss 17(1)(c) (use of ‘profane indecent or 
obscene language or threatening abusive or insulting words’), (1)(d) (behave ‘in a riotous indecent 
offensive or insulting manner’); Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6(1) (general offence of ‘public 
nuisance’ which includes behaving in an ‘offensive way’), s 6(2)(a)(ii)), such as using offensive language 
(s 6(3)(a))); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 392 (offensive behaviour); Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) ss 13 
(offence of ‘public annoyance’ which includes behaving in an ‘offensive … manner’ (s 13(1)(a))), 21 
(offence of ‘prohibited behaviour’ which includes wilfully behaving in an ‘offensive’ manner); Criminal 
Code Act 1913 (WA) s 74A(2) (behaving in a ‘disorderly manner’ including using ‘offensive … 
language’ (s 74A(1)(a)) and an ‘offensive … manner’ (s 74A(1)(b))); Summary Offences Act (NT) s 47(a) 
(offensive conduct including ‘offensive … behaviour’ or using ‘obscene language’). 
4  See generally Brown et al, above n 2, 746–71. See also Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, 
Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2010) 842–56; Donna Spears, Julia Quilter and Clive 
Harfield, Criminal Law for Common Law States (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2011) ch 8. 
5  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 November 1970, 8005 (Frank 
Walker), cited in Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, Study of Street Offences by Aborigines 
(1982) 2 [1.3]. 
6  Doreen J McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (MacMillan, 1983) 143. 
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analysis is the idea of ‘legal relevance’ – the assumption that ‘the offences dealt 
with in the lower courts do not involve much law or require much legal expertise 
or advocacy.’7 As McBarnet counters: ‘[i]t is not in the nature of drunkenness, 
breach of the peace or petty theft to be less susceptible than fraud, burglary or 
murder to complex legal argument; it is rather in the nature of the procedure by 
which they are tried.’8 
We would add to McBarnet’s list of ‘lesser’ crimes a pair that are amongst 
the most frequently prosecuted on the NSW statute books – offensive conduct 
and offensive language under sections 4 and 4A of the Summary Offences Act 
1988 (NSW). During 2012, 5612 charges for these two offences were finalised in 
the Local Court of NSW,9 and 6808 people were issued with a Criminal 
Infringement Notice (‘CIN’) in relation to alleged breaches of sections 4 and 
4A.10 
How is it that for two crimes that are enforced more than 12 000 times 
annually, and more than two decades after their current statutory formulation was 
endorsed by the NSW Parliament, it remains unclear what the elements of the 
crime are, and no comprehensive guidance on the elements of sections 4 and 4A 
has emanated from the Supreme Court of NSW? It is not our intention to lay 
blame at the feet of the judiciary or the ranks of criminal law practitioners. The 
‘blind spot’ that motivates this article is also evident amongst academic lawyers. 
Public order offences are still routinely ignored in criminal law textbooks.11 In 
those works that do take offensive conduct and offensive language seriously as 
aspects of the criminal law to which students should be exposed, the tendency is 
to (rightly) problematise the operation of such laws, and to point, without 
offering solutions, to the uncertainty that exists.12 The scholarly literature that 
addresses the topic of offensive conduct and language crimes – much of which is 
excellent – tends to focus on the operation of these laws, often informed by 
illuminating historical, sociological and criminological perspectives, and with an 
                                                 
7  Ibid 147. 
8  Ibid 148. 
9  NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, ‘NSW Criminal Courts Statistics 2012’ (Report, NSW 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2013) 21. 
10  Unpublished New South Wales recorded crime statistics for 2012 provided by the NSW Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research (on file with the authors). 
11  See, eg, Robert Hayes and Michael Eburn, Criminal Law and Procedure in New South Wales 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2009); Penny Crofts, Criminal Law Elements (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 4th ed, 2011); Louis Waller and Bob Williams, Criminal Law: Text and Cases (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 11th ed, 2009); Kenneth J Arenson, Mirko Bagaric and Peter Gillies, Australian Criminal 
Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions: Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2011). 
12  See Brown et al, above n 2, 763; Bronitt and McSherry, above n 4, 842–5. For a notable exception, see 
Spears, Quilter and Harfield, above n 4, 154–72. 




explicit normative reformist agenda.13 Sections 4 and 4A of the Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) have not, to this point, been the subject of close 
doctrinal analysis or exegesis, particularly in relation to fault (as opposed to 
conduct) elements. 
In this article we approach the neglected crimes of offensive conduct and 
language, influenced by the insights of scholars such as McBarnet, adopting a 
still critical, but also pragmatic, perspective, by asking the following questions: 
can we tolerate any longer the uncertainty that surrounds the parameters of 
charges under sections 4 and 4A that yield thousands of convictions every year, 
and that, in the case of offensive conduct, carries the possibility of incarceration? 
If the answer to this question is ‘no’ (and we believe it is), is it possible to 
articulate with greater precision the boundaries of this area of ‘criminality’? With 
courage and caution in equal measure, we assert that it is both possible and 
desirable to do so, and, in this article, we outline an approach to doing so. 
In our view, every criminal offence should be capable of clear articulation in 
terms of conduct and fault elements – especially offences that are charged in high 
volumes every year and which are controversial inclusions in the statute books.14 
We are not naive about the possibility of achieving absolute clarity and certainty 
in this or, indeed, any other law. Such ‘perfection’ is unrealistic given, among 
many other considerations, the nature of legal language and the (often contested) 
                                                 
13  Ken Buckley, Offensive and Obscene: A Civil Liberties Casebook (Ure Smith, 1970) ch 6; David 
Weisbrot, ‘Sex, Words and Magistrates’ (1991) 16 Legal Service Bulletin 297; John Stratton, ‘Offensive 
Behaviour’ (1991) 16 Legal Service Bulletin 132; Kevin Kitchener, ‘Street Offences and the Summary 
Offences Act (1988): Social Control in the 1990s’ in Chris Cunneen (ed), Aboriginal Perspectives on 
Criminal Justice (Institute of Criminology, Sydney University Law School, 1992) 19; Bill Walsh, 
‘Offensive Language: A Legal Perspective’ in Diana Eades (ed), Language in Evidence: Issues 
Confronting Aboriginal and Multicultural Australia (University of New South Wales Press, 1995) 203; 
Tamara Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance: Empirical and 
Theoretical Analyses’ (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 123; Joanne Lennan, ‘The “Janus 
Faces” of Offensive Language Laws, 1970–2005’ (2006) 8 University of Technology Sydney Law Review 
118; Jo Lennan, ‘The Development of Language Laws in Nineteenth-Century New South Wales’ (2007) 
18 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 449; James Leaver, ‘Swear Like a Victorian: Victoria’s Swearing 
Laws and Similar Provisions in NSW and Queensland’ (2011) 36 Alternative Law Journal 163; Mark 
Dennis, ‘“Dog Arse Cunts”: A Discussion Paper on the Law of Offensive Language and Offensive 
Manner’ (Discussion Paper, June 2011) 
<http://criminalcle.net.au/attachments/Offensive_Language_and_Offensive_Manner_Discussion_Paper_
_Dog_Arse_Cunts.pdf>; Elyse Methven, ‘Should Penalty Notices be Issued for Using Offensive 
Language?’ (2012) 37 Alternative Law Journal 63. See also Anti-Discrimination Board of New South 
Wales, above n 5; Robert Jochelson, ‘Aborigines and Public Order Legislation in New South Wales’ 
(2007) 34 Crime and Justice Bulletin 1; NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, ‘Race and 
Offensive Language Charges’ (Crime and Justice Statistics Bureau Brief, NSW Bureau of Crimes 
Statistics and Research, August 1999); Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council, ‘Policing Public Order: 
Offensive Language & Behaviour, the Impact on Aboriginal People’ (Report, Aboriginal Justice 
Advisory Council, 1999). 
14  As will be discussed in more detail in Part III below, offensive language and conduct laws are 
controversial for reasons that include free speech infringement and their disproportionate impact on 
already marginalised individuals and communities (most notably, Indigenous Australians). 
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processes of interpretation that are involved in deriving meaning,15 and the effect 
of discretion in decision-making.16 That said, certain unresolved ambiguities in 
the definition of offensive conduct and offensive language under the Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) can be remedied and ought to be. We are prepared to 
be bold in our proffered interpretations in the hope that, even if they are wrong, 
this article will nonetheless prompt wider engagement with questions that have 
escaped rigorous academic and judicial scrutiny for too long. 
The legitimacy of criminal offences such as those defined by sections 4 and 
4A – that turn on the concept of offensiveness – has rightly been the subject of 
rigorous critique, including by eminent criminal law theorists.17 For what it is 
worth, our own normative position is unambiguous: offensiveness has no place in 
Australian law as a basis for criminality and any offences that turn on an 
offensiveness standard (including sections 4 and 4A) should be abolished 
immediately. But it is not our aim in this article to prosecute this position; a 
position that has already attracted much scholarly attention.18 Rather, our aim is 
to confront the reality that sections 4 and 4A not only remain on the statute books 
in NSW, but they have been entrenched there for decades, and continue to be 
actively enforced. As long as this is the case, an attempt must be made to elicit 
judicial guidance in relation to the scope and elements of sections 4 and 4A of 
the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). While our proposals for interpreting 
these offences do not deliver abolition, they do have the potential to at least 
provide a legal foundation for defending charges and narrowing the scope of 
sections 4 and 4A, thereby reducing (if not removing) the demonstrable risks of 
over-policing and over-criminalisation which have too often been realised in 
NSW. 
The body of this article is in three parts. Part II introduces the statutory 
provisions which define offensive conduct and offensive language, including a 
brief examination of the historical evolution of this form of public order offence. 
Part III deals with the operation of the laws, highlighting a number of concerns 
that have been raised about their reach in practice, including their 
disproportionate impact on Aboriginal people in NSW. Part IV sets out a 
methodology for construing statutory offences which we then apply to sections 4 
and 4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) with reference to the known 
case law. 
 
                                                 
15  See Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (MacMillan, 
1987); Christopher Hutton, Language, Meaning and the Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
16  Brown et al, above n 2, 119. 
17  See, eg, Andrew Von Hirsch and A P Simester (eds), Incivilities: Regulating Offensive Behaviour (Hart, 
2006). See also Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press, 2012) ch 5 (in the 
context of hate speech laws). 
18  Von Hirsch and Simester, above n 17; Brown et al, above n 2, 763; Bronitt and McSherry, above n 4, 
842–5. 




II   THE LEGISLATION 
The crimes of offensive conduct and offensive language are found in part 2 
division 1 ‘Offensive behaviour’, sections 4 and 4A respectively, of the Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW). The offences contained in this division cover a broad 
range of behaviour, including offensive conduct and language (sections 4 and 
4A), obscene exposure (section 5), damaging fountains (section 7), damaging or 
desecrating protected places (section 8) and violent disorder (section 11A). 
Sections 4 and 4A provide: 
4 Offensive conduct  
(1)  A person must not conduct himself or herself in an offensive manner in or 
near, or within view or hearing from, a public place or a school. Maximum 
penalty: 6 penalty units or imprisonment for 3 months. 
(2)  A person does not conduct himself or herself in an offensive manner as 
referred to in subsection (1) merely by using offensive language. 
(3)  It is a sufficient defence to a prosecution for an offence under this section 
if the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant had a reasonable 
excuse for conducting himself or herself in the manner alleged in the 
information for the offence. 
4A Offensive language  
(1)  A person must not use offensive language in or near, or within hearing 
from, a public place or a school. Maximum penalty: 6 penalty units. 
(2)  It is a sufficient defence to a prosecution for an offence under this section 
if the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant had a reasonable 
excuse for conducting himself or herself in the manner alleged in the 
information for the offence. 
(3)  Instead of imposing a fine on a person, the court: 
(a)  may make an order under section 8 (1) of the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 directing the person to perform community 
service work, or 
(b)  may make an order under section 5 (1) of the Children (Community 
Service Orders) Act 1987 requiring the person to perform community 
service work, as the case requires. 
(6)  However, the maximum number of hours of community service work that a 
person may be required to perform under an order in respect of an offence 
under this section is 100 hours. 
These statutory formulations of offensive conduct and language are the 
latest iterations of offences which date back, in Australia, to the mid-19th 
century. A full historical account is beyond the scope of this paper,19 but it is 
worth noting that the common law and early legislation did not criminalise 
offensiveness per se but included a public disorder or ‘breach of the peace’ 
                                                 
19  See generally Brown et al, above n 2, 749–52. See also Lennan, ‘The Development of Language Laws in 
Nineteenth-Century New South Wales’, above n 13. 
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component. That is, they required proof that the conduct was intended, or 
reasonably likely to ‘provoke unlawful physical retaliation’.20 
Section 6 of the Vagrancy Acts 1851 (NSW) is illustrative: 
And be it enacted That any person who shall use any threatening abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour in any public street thoroughfare or place with 
intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace may be 
occasioned shall forfeit and pay on conviction in a summary way by any Justice 
of the Peace any sum not exceeding five pounds and in default of immediate 
payment shall be committed to the common gaol or house of correction for any 
period not exceeding three calendar months. 
By 1908, the ‘intent to provoke a breach of the peace’ element had been 
removed and the word ‘offensive’ was added to ‘the string of adjectives used to 
describe prohibited behaviour.’21 In our view, this omission substantially 
changed both the nature of the offence and its justification. Specifically, it 
blurred the edges of the criminal law’s reach and expanded the opportunity for 
the police, and the courts, to regulate conduct that had previously been regarded 
as beyond the legitimate limits of the state’s authority to intervene and punish; 
that is, conduct which does not cause harm or carry the risk of harm.22 It is one 
of the reasons that offensive conduct and language laws, in their current 
formulation, have attracted criticism for being overly broad. 
 
A   A Constitutional Question? 
The permissibility, and constitutional validity, of broadly drawn public order 
offences that do not contain a ‘breach of the peace’ element were considered by 
the High Court in Coleman v Power.23 Prior to the repeal of the statute in 2005,24 
section 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) 
created an offence similar to section 4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 
(NSW): using ‘insulting words to any person’ (emphasis added) in a public place. 
Like the offences defined by sections 4 and 4A in NSW, Queensland’s insulting 
words offence had once contained a breach of the peace component, but it was 
removed in 1931.25 
A majority of the High Court found that the breadth of the offence defined by 
section 7(1)(d) was constitutionally unacceptable. Justice McHugh ruled that 
section 7(1)(d) was invalid by virtue of inconsistency with the implied freedom 
of political communication which, since 1997, the High Court has held to be 
implicit in the Australian Constitution.26 Justices Gummow, Hayne and Kirby 
                                                 
20  To use the phrase preferred by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 77 [193]. 
This case is discussed further below. 
21  Brown et al, above n 2, 752. 
22  On harm as a justification for criminalisation, see ibid 76. 
23  (2004) 220 CLR 1. 
24  Replaced by a ‘public nuisance’ offence, now found in s 6 of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld).  
25  Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld). See also Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 21 
[3] (Gleeson CJ). 
26  Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 33 [36] (McHugh J). See Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’). 




‘saved’ the provision from invalidity by narrowly construing the scope of the 
offence so that it only covered conduct where the words used were ‘either … 
intended to provoke unlawful physical retaliation, or they are reasonably likely to 
provoke unlawful physical retaliation from either the person to whom they are 
directed or some other who hears the words uttered’27 – that is, by reading in a 
‘breach of the peace’ element. This conclusion was supported by both the 
specific constitutional principles established in Lange, as well as broader free 
speech considerations. Justices Gummow and Hayne observed: 
[Section] 7(1)(d) creates a criminal offence. The offence which it creates restricts 
freedom of speech. That freedom is not, and never has been, absolute. But in 
confining the limits of the freedom, a legislature must mark the boundary it sets with 
clarity. Fundamental common law rights are not to be eroded or curtailed save by 
clear words.28 
In Coleman v Power none of the High Court judges considered the 
implications of their analysis for the offensive conduct and offensive language 
laws which continue to operate in other Australian states and territories. Future 
scrutiny is likely, however, particularly given that, as Gleeson CJ noted, some 
such offences (and this list includes sections 4 and 4A in NSW) do not have a 
‘breach of the peace’ element.29 
The matter has not yet been addressed by the courts in NSW, but has been 
considered on one occasion by the Supreme Court of Victoria. In Ferguson v 
Walkley30 Harper J considered the implications of Coleman v Power for the 
offence of using insulting words in a public place contrary to section 17(1)(c) of 
the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic). On an appeal against conviction by 
Norman Ferguson, an Aboriginal man, Harper J dismissed the suggestion that the 
High Court’s decision in Coleman v Power required him to conclude that 
criminal punishment for offensive or insulting words must be limited to 
                                                 
27  Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 74 [183] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also at 98–9 (Kirby J). 
28  Ibid 75 [185]. Tamara Walsh has suggested that the High Court’s decision had little immediate effect on 
the way in which the police were responding to ‘offensive’ behaviour, notwithstanding the intent evident 
in several of the judgments to ‘rein in’ the scope of offensiveness-based crimes, specifically, the offence 
of ‘public nuisance’ now found in s 6 of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). See Tamara Walsh, ‘The 
Impact of Coleman v Power on the Policing, Defence and Sentencing of Public Nuisance Cases in 
Queensland’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 191. 
29  Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 23 [8] (Gleeson CJ). Roger Douglas has suggested that the High 
Court’s decision might prompt further constitutional challenges: 
  The decision may also have implications for other, overlapping, public order offences. Insofar as they apply to 
political discourse, abusive language laws would also seem to be bad except insofar as the abuse is calculated to 
produce a breach of the peace. There is no obvious reason why, by analogy with Coleman v Power they should not 
be so read down. Offensive language laws would fall foul of the constitutional freedom insofar as they enabled 
people to be prosecuted for offensive non-verbal political communications. Sooner or later, anti-censorship 
campaigners will challenge the constitutionality of indecent language/behaviour laws: Roger Douglas, ‘The 
Constitutional Freedom to Insult: The Insignificance of Coleman v Power’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 23, 27. 
 See also Dennis, above n 13, 6. For further commentary on Coleman v Power, see Elisa Arcioni, 
‘Developments in Free Speech Law in Australia: Coleman and Mulholland’ (2005) 33 Federal Law 
Review 333. 
30  (2008) 17 VR 647. 
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situations where the words are intended or reasonably likely to provoke unlawful 
retaliation. He preferred the approach of Gleeson CJ in Coleman v Power – one 
of the minority justices who did not strike down or read down section 7(1)(d) – 
who held that the offence could be made out where the insulting words were 
‘intended or likely to provoke a forceful response’ or where ‘the use of the 
language, in the place where it is spoken, to a person of that kind, is contrary to 
contemporary standards of public good order.’31 
By contrast, in New Zealand, the courts have interpreted the comparable 
offence as requiring a breach of the peace element. In Morse v The Police the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand, influenced by the protection of freedom of 
expression in section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), held that the offence 
of behaving ‘in an offensive or disorderly manner … in or within view of any 
public place’ under section 4(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1981 (NZ) 
requires proof of a disruption of public order (and not mere offensiveness).32 
 
III   OPERATION OF THE LAWS 
The manner and frequency with which offensive conduct and offensive 
language offences have been enforced in NSW, add further weight to the case for 
clarification of their elements. By any measure, sections 4 and 4A of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) are ‘high volume’ criminal offences. A large 
proportion of the public order charges which are heard in the Local Court each 
year relate to offensive conduct or offensive language. In 2012, more than 14 000 
‘public order offence’ charges were finalised in the NSW Local Court and almost 
40 per cent of these were charges of offensive language (1830) or offensive 
behaviour (3782).33 
Opportunities for both scrutiny of the circumstances in which charges are laid 
and close examination of the legal elements of the offences have been rare given 
that offensive conduct and language charges, as with most summary offences, 
attract high rates of guilty pleas.34 The relative ‘invisibility’ of these offences 
from judicial consideration, has been exacerbated more recently by the 
introduction of the CIN scheme. Since 2007, NSW Police have had the option of 
                                                 
31  Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 26 [14] (Gleeson CJ). The constitutional validity of other laws 
creating offences broadly relating to offensive conduct have also been questioned recently, based on the 
implied freedom of political communication. In Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259 the High Court 
split 3:3 on the question of the validity of the offence under s 471.12 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) of 
using a postal service in a way that is, amongst others things, offensive. The result of the deadlock was 
that decision under appeal – a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal upholding the legislation 
– was affirmed. In A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197 the High Court 
overturned the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia’s finding of invalidity in relation to a 
City of Adelaide by-law that prohibited touting for business, or conducting any survey or opinion poll on 
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proceeding in relation to alleged breaches of sections 4 and 4A of the Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) by way of issuing a CIN (which is a penalty notice or 
‘on the spot’ fine).35 
In 2008, the first full year of operation of the statewide availability of CINs, 
4078 CINs were issued for offensive conduct and 2023 CINs were issued for 
offensive language36 and, as will be discussed below, with no equivalent 
reduction in court attendances for these offences. In a review of the first nine 
months of operation of the statewide CIN scheme, the NSW Ombudsman found 
that 70 per cent of the CINs issued during the review period (November 2007 to 
July 2008), were for offensive conduct or offensive language.37 These figures 
clearly speak volumes and the concerns raised by the Ombudsman in relation to 
the use of CINs for these offences will be addressed below.38 The latest available 
data suggest that the high volume use of CINs has continued: 4760 persons were 
issued with a CIN in relation to section 4 and 2048 persons were issued with a 
CIN in relation to section 4A in 2012.39 
 
A   Impact on Aboriginal People and Communities40 
In addition to the frequency with which section 4 and 4A charges are laid, 
and CINs issued, it is not possible to discuss the operation of these offences 
without addressing the disproportionate impact of offensive conduct and 
offensive language laws on Aboriginal people. The evidence is overwhelming 
and disturbing. In its 1982 Study of Street Offences by Aborigines, the Anti-
Discrimination Board of NSW found evidence of over-representation of 
Aboriginal people, particularly in rural, regional and remote parts of the state. 
Based on an examination of court appearances in 10 NSW towns with high 
Aboriginal populations (including a 1978 sample and a 1980 sample) the Board 
found that ‘Aborigines charged with minor offences in public places greatly 
outnumber non-Aborigines.’41 Using unseemly words – the equivalent of what is 
today section 4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) – was the most 
common type of offence (56 per cent in 1978 and 61 per cent in 1980).42 The 
Board noted that ‘[t]he words “fuck” and “cunt”, used singly or together, 
accounted for 94 per cent of the charges of using unseemly words in 1980. The 
                                                 
35  Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 333; Criminal Procedure Regulation 2010 (NSW) sch 3. The 
penalty amount is $200 for offensive conduct and $150 for offensive language. 
36  NSW Ombudsman, ‘Review of the Impact of Criminal Infringement Notices on Aboriginal 
Communities’ (Report, NSW Ombudsman, August 2009) 42–3. 
37  Ibid 52. 
38  See also Methven, above n 13. 
39  Unpublished New South Wales recorded crime statistics for 2012 provided by the NSW Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research (on file with the authors). 
40  This section draws on material written by McNamara for Brown et al, above n 2, 754–5. 
41  Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, above n 5, iv. 
42  Ibid 48–9. 
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target or victim of this verbal abuse was most frequently a member of the police 
force. … Liquor was a factor in about two thirds of cases.’43 
A similar picture of over-representation of Aboriginal people emerged from a 
1990s study of offensive language and offensive behaviour charges conducted by 
the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (‘BOCSAR’). Robert 
Jochelson found that the four local government areas in NSW with the highest 
percentages of Aborigines in their populations (Brewarrina (42 per cent), Walgett 
(18 per cent), Bourke (23 per cent) and Central Darling (25 per cent)), had the 
highest rates of Local Court appearances for offensive language.44 Narratives 
taken from police reports on arrests for offensive language and offensive 
behaviour revealed that 
the principal distinguishing feature of the majority of incidents of offensive 
behaviour and offensive language is excessive alcohol consumption and/or 
interpersonal conflict of some kind. In the high Aboriginal country area this 
conflict often involves seemingly ritual confrontations between police and 
Aboriginal people over swearing in public places or at police themselves. 
Sometimes the person reported for offensive behaviour and/or offensive language 
seems to have taken the initiative in provoking the confrontation. Sometimes the 
confrontation occurs when police question or attempt to detain an Aboriginal 
person in relation to matters unrelated to offensive behaviour or, alternatively, 
when police attend an altercation or dispute among Aboriginal people or between 
non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal people. In circumstances where police are called to 
an incident, charges of offensive behaviour and/or offensive language appear most 
likely to ensue when police find themselves unable to calm a situation or when 
they themselves become the subject of abuse.45 
These patterns of overrepresentation of Aboriginal people particularly in 
country areas and charges being laid largely in relation to confrontations with 
police continued through the 1990s and 2000s despite the Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (‘RCIADIC’) recommending that ‘[t]he use of 
offensive language in circumstances of interventions initiated by police should 
not normally be occasion for arrest and charge.’46 BOCSAR data from the 2000s 
on the distribution of offensive behaviour and offensive language charges across 
NSW suggests a continuation of the patterns described above.47 Recent reports by 
the NSW Ombudsman and the NSW Law Reform Commission (discussed 
below) provide further evidence in support of this assessment. 
At first glance, the increased use of CINs during the last decade, as an 
alternative to arrest or other modes of initiation for selected offences, including 
minor public order offences, might be seen as consistent with the underlying 
objectives of the RCIADIC’s recommendations. In fact, the statewide availability 
                                                 
43  Ibid v. 
44  Jochelson, above n 13, 9. 
45  Ibid 15. 
46  Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report (1991) vol 3, 
29, Recommendation 86(a).  
47  See Brown et al, above n 2, 753–5. See also New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Penalty 
Notices, Report No 132 (2012) 301–2; Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council, above n 13; NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, above n 13; Lennan, ‘The “Janus Faces” of Offensive Language Laws, 
1970–2005’, above n 12; Leaver, above n 13. 




of CINs since 2007 has heightened concerns about the disproportionate impact of 
offensive conduct and offensive language laws on Aboriginal people. A 2009 
report completed by the NSW Ombudsman concluded that 83 per cent of the 
CINs issued to Aboriginal persons were for offensive conduct or language.48 The 
Ombudsman addressed concerns that the availability of CINs for public order 
offences like offensive conduct and offensive language might be having a net-
widening effect: 
With half of all adult offensive conduct and offensive language incidents detected 
in NSW now resulting in CINs, there can be no doubt that the scheme is having a 
major impact on how police deal with these offences. Overall legal actions in 
relation to these two offences are increasing, and Aboriginal people remain 
significantly overrepresented in relation to both. 
The initial state-wide data indicates that CINs are contributing to a significant net 
increase in legal action taken on offensive language and offensive conduct 
incidents. That is, some offenders are being diverted from court, but the early data 
indicates that the decreases in court appearances are being eclipsed by the very 
high numbers of minor offenders now being fined for those offences.49 
The problem of inadequate scrutiny of the circumstances in which CINs are 
issued to Aboriginal people for offensive conduct and offensive language is 
heightened by the Ombudsman’s finding that ‘Aboriginal people are less likely to 
request a review or elect to have the matter heard at court’,50 in a context where 
overall rates of review request and court election are already very low.51 
In its recent report on penalty notices,52 the NSW Law Reform Commission 
raised similar concerns about the net-widening effect after finding that since the 
statewide introduction of CINs in 2007 there has been a 23 per cent increase in 
‘contacts’53 for offensive language.54 
In its submission to the NSW Ombudsman, the Law Society of NSW 
suggested that ‘much of the language on which charges or CINs are based is not 
offensive at law.’55 The Ombudsman found support for this claim, stating that 
‘[a]lmost two-thirds of the offensive language CINs that we audited for the report 
were issued for language or were in circumstances where the recipient may have 
had a sufficient defence if the matter was heard at court.’56 
  
                                                 
48  NSW Ombudsman, above n 36, 56. 
49  Ibid 71. 
50  Ibid Foreword. 
51  Ibid 115.  
52  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 47. In its 2012 report on penalty notices, the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended that ‘[r]eview by a senior police officer of 
Criminal Infringement Notices issued for offensive language and offensive conduct should be mandatory 
and should not depend on application’: at 306. 
53  Ibid 294. This includes Court Attendance Notices (‘CANs’), Youth Conferences, Young Offenders Act 
cautions and warnings, Infringement Notices and CINs: at 294 n 50. 
54  Ibid. 
55  NSW Ombudsman, above n 36, 62. 
56  Ibid 9. 
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The NSW Law Reform Commission echoed this finding: 
In consultations for this inquiry we were told by lawyers representing clients 
issued with CINs and penalty notices for offensive language that they often tried 
to persuade clients to court-elect but that they were unwilling to do so and paid 
their penalty even if they believed that the offence was not made out.57 
The Commission questioned whether it was appropriate to allow enforcement 
by penalty notice in the case of ‘offences that require judgment in relation to 
matters involving community standards, such as “offensiveness”’;58 investigated 
whether offensive conduct and offensive language should be removed from the 
CINs scheme;59 and gave serious consideration to recommending the abolition of 
offensive language.60 Ultimately, the Commission stopped short of this final 
consideration, recommending instead that ‘the offence of offensive language in 
the Summary Offences Act … should be further investigated as a matter of 
urgency’ and that ‘[t]he offence of offensive conduct … be similarly 
considered.’61 
So long as sections 4 and 4A remain on the statute books, the evidence 
gathered by both the NSW Ombudsman (2009) and the NSW Reform 
Commission (2012) in relation to the operation of these provisions reinforces our 
conviction that an attempt must be made to elicit judicial guidance in relation to 
the scope and elements of sections 4 and 4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 
(NSW). It is true that ‘these offences are rarely challenged in court’,62 but this 
fact cannot be taken as a justification for accepting the status quo. While it may 
currently be the case that ‘little binding precedent is available’,63 this gap should 
be remedied. Indeed, the fact that the enforcement of offensive conduct and 
offensive language laws is frequently ‘hidden’ from arm’s length scrutiny (ie 
beyond the police) makes it especially important that clarification be provided. 
In this regard, the Ombudsman noted in its 2009 report that it had previously 
recommended ‘in a 2005 report on an earlier CINs trial’,64 that the NSW Police 
should provide ‘clear guidance … on what does and does not constitute offensive 
language and conduct’ so that officers can determine whether a CIN is ‘the 
appropriate intervention’.65 The Ombudsman described the Police Force’s 
response to this recommendation: 
In response to Recommendation 5, the NSW Police Force initially undertook to 
issue a Law Note providing guidance on existing case law regarding whether the 
language used is offensive, but noting that any decision on ‘whether to lay a 
charge, issue a CAN, issue a CIN or issue a caution is a matter for the exercise of 
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discretion by the individual officer’. After further consideration, police 
subsequently advised that there was insufficient recent and authoritative case law 
in this area to support a Law Note that provided further clarification to frontline 
officers in this area, and instead included two case studies in materials used to 
train officers on the appropriate use of CINs.66 
There is something deeply unsatisfactory about this explanation. Judicial 
guidance is long overdue, and, in the absence of adequate internal police force 
guidance to officers, critically important. 
 
IV   A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO SECTIONS 4 AND 4A 
This part of the article is in three sections. First, drawing on the High Court 
decision of He Kaw Teh,67 and the judgment of Brennan J in particular, we set 
out a methodological approach for construing the elements for statutory offences 
generally. Following McBarnet,68 we advocate this approach because, contrary to 
assumptions about the relative simplicity of ‘lesser crimes’, many statutory 
offences (typically dealt with in the Local Court) are legally very complicated. In 
particular, they raise questions about whether mens rea is required for a particular 
actus reus component or whether the element is strict or absolute. Many of these 
issues are rarely judicially considered whether in the Local Court – perhaps an 
unsurprising result given the ‘ideology of triviality’ that pervades the 
jurisdiction69 and with its high volume case load of summary offences (along 
with indictable offences triable summarily70) – or at an appellate level. However, 
it is precisely because judicial consideration has been uncommon that we 
advocate for attention and clarification. The methodology we set out here 
provides precision in identifying the relevant actus reus (prohibited conduct or 
physical elements) and mens rea (fault or mental elements), if any. Secondly, we 
will apply this approach to sections 4 and 4A with reference to the known case 
law and, finally, provide a suggested approach as to how the elements should be 
construed. 
 
A   Methodology 
Despite the proliferation of statutory offences that do not necessarily conform 
to the classic actus reus and correlating mens rea formula, it is appropriate, and 
necessary in our view, to approach the construction of all criminal offences by 
asking: what constitutes the actus reus; and what, if any, is the correlating mens 
rea requirement? Relatively minor summary offences, like offensive conduct and 
offensive language, are no less deserving of rigorous technical analysis of their 
elements than serious indictable offences, like drug importation. Indeed, because 
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of the paucity of case law construing such offences the need for such analysis 
may be even greater. 
 
1 Actus Reus 
Following He Kaw Teh, the actus reus of an offence may be broken down 
into: 
• the act or conduct (act, series of acts or omissions or a combination, or a 
state of affairs); 
• the circumstances (or context) in which the conduct is performed (or 
omission made); and 
• the results or consequences of the conduct. 
Not all offences will have a circumstance and/or consequence component but 
all will have an act or conduct aspect. According to Brennan J, ‘[t]hese elements 
– conduct, circumstances and results – are what Dixon CJ in Vallance v The 
Queen called “the external elements necessary to form the crime.”’71 
In relation to circumstance components, Brennan J drew a further distinction, 
which we think is often overlooked, and which is central to our analysis of 
sections 4 and 4A. According to Brennan J a circumstance, as an element of an 
offence, may be either a circumstance that is an integral part of the act or a 
circumstance that attends the doing of an act.72 Justice Brennan gives the 
example of rape from the English case of Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Morgan.73 In the speeches in the House of Lords, the external elements of the 
offence were treated as sexual intercourse (conduct/act) and non-consent 
(integral circumstance). These were said to be integral parts of the whole act.74 
Similarly, Brennan J found that the offence (as it then was) under consideration 
in He Kaw Teh – importing ‘prohibited imports’ contrary to section 233B(1) of 
the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) – comprised an act (of importing) with an integral 
circumstance (narcotic goods).75 By contrast, the offence of assaulting a member 
of the police force in the due execution of his or her duty – the offence 
considered by the High Court in R v Reynhoudt – was found by the majority in 
that case as having an actus reus comprising an assault (act) of a police officer in 
execution of duty (attendant circumstance).76 
As we will discuss below, the distinction between circumstances that are 
integral and those that are attendant will not always be an easy one to draw. 
However, the implications of how a circumstance component is characterised can 
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be great. Most notably, Brennan J argues in He Kaw Teh that while an integral 
circumstance may readily require the mental element of ‘knowledge’, an 
attendant circumstance may not.77 
 
2 Mens Rea 
There is a presumption in the common law that all criminal offences require 
proof of mens rea in relation to each element of actus reus.78 That presumption 
may be displaced in certain circumstances, in which case a ‘lesser’ fault element 
may attach to a particular actus reus component or it may attract no fault element 
at all (ie absolute liability). Mens rea, of course, refers to ‘guilty mind’, however, 
as Brennan J said in He Kaw Teh: 
It is one thing to say that mens rea is an element of an offence; it is another thing 
to say precisely what is the state of mind that is required. … The particular mental 
states that apply to the several external elements of an offence must be 
distinguished, not only as a matter of legal analysis, but in order to maintain 
tolerable harmony between the criminal law and human experience.79 
Typically the relevant mens rea for the corresponding actus reus components 
are: intent for the act/conduct; knowledge or recklessness for a circumstance; and 
intent, recklessness or knowledge for the consequence component.80 
 
3 Rebutting the Presumption 
The case of He Kaw Teh makes it clear that the presumption of mens rea may 
be rebutted where to do so would be more consonant with the purpose of the Act. 
The case establishes that three considerations in particular are to be taken into 
account: the words of the statute; the subject matter with which the statute deals; 
and the utility of imposing strict liability.81 
 
(a) Words of the Statute 
The offence must be analysed to determine whether the legislature has either 
clearly expressed an intention that mens rea is required or there is a necessary 
implication that it is so required.82 Where an offence contains words such as 
‘knowingly’, ‘dishonestly’ or ‘willfully’ it will be difficult to displace the 
presumption of mens rea. The absence of such words, however, does not imply 
that the offence is one of strict or absolute liability. An analysis should be made 
not only of the relevant provision but also the context in which the offence is to 
be found. 
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(b) Subject Matter 
Where the offence may be said to be what Gibbs CJ and Brennan J referred 
to as ‘truly criminal’, as opposed to regulatory, it is more likely that mens rea is 
required.83 This dichotomy is not unproblematic; it is vaguely drawn,84 and there 
has been little subsequent judicial clarification. For present purposes it should not 
be too readily assumed that a relatively minor (or ‘trivial’) offence should 
necessarily be regarded as regulatory in nature, rather than ‘truly criminal’. The 
fact that an offence is enforced via conventional criminal justice system agents 
and processes – including the involvement of police in apprehension, charge and 
prosecution – is a consideration that tends to militate against a ‘merely 
regulatory’ categorisation.85 
Other subject matter indicia that may be relevant to the task of determining 
the applicable mens rea include the penalty for the offence and the moral or 
public obloquy that the person may suffer if convicted of the offence.86 
Generally, an offence that may result in a term of imprisonment – particularly a 
substantial one – is more likely to be an offence of mens rea as opposed to an 
offence punishable by a fine. 
 
(c) Utility of Imposing Strict Liability 
The third consideration was described by Gibbs CJ in He Kaw Teh as an inquiry 
into whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement 
of the regulations, indicating that there must be something that the accused can do in 
order to avoid the relevant unlawful conduct: ‘[c]learly, however, no good purpose 
would be served by punishing a person who had taken reasonable care and yet had 
unknowingly been an innocent agent to import narcotics.’87 
In relation to this third consideration, Brennan J stated: 
However grave the mischief at which a statute is aimed may be, the presumption is 
that the statute does not impose criminal liability without mens rea unless the purpose 
of the statute is not merely to deter a person from engaging in prohibited conduct but 
to compel him to take preventive measures to avoid the possibility that, without 
deliberate conduct on his part, the external elements of the offence might occur. A 
statute is not so construed unless effective precautions can be taken to avoid the 
possibility of the occurrence of the external elements of the offence. … The 
requirement of mens rea is at once a reflection of the purpose of the statute and a 
humane protection for persons who unwittingly engage in prohibited conduct.88 
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4 The Integral/Attendant Circumstance Distinction 
In He Kaw Teh, Brennan J held that where a circumstance is integral to the 
act, there is a strong presumption that the relevant mens rea will be intent or 
knowledge. By contrast, where the circumstance is attendant, it may be that a 
lesser mental state applies. That is, the presumption is weaker, and more easily 
displaced, in the case of an attendant circumstance: 
[I]f there be a legislative intention to apply a mental element to the circumstances 
different from the mental element applicable to the act involved in the offence, it 
is necessary to decide what circumstances are defined to be an integral part of the 
act (to which intent and therefore knowledge will ordinarily apply) and what 
circumstances are defined to be merely attendant (to which no mental element 
may be intended to apply or to which a mental element less than knowledge may 
be intended to apply).89 
… 
As intent is the mental state ordinarily required in respect of the doing of an act 
involved in the commission of an offence, any mental state less than knowledge 
would not be presumed to apply to the circumstances which give that act its 
character. A mental state less than knowledge can apply more readily to 
circumstances attendant on the occurrence of an act involved in the commission of 
an offence being circumstances which make the act criminal. The absence of an 
exculpatory belief can apply to such circumstances where the prima facie 
requirement (knowledge) is excluded.90 
In our view, the key question can be put as follows: is the circumstance in 
question essential to giving the conduct in question its criminal character? If yes, 
the circumstance is integral. If no, the circumstance is attendant. Or to put it 
another way: is it meaningful to talk of the conduct being criminal in the absence 
of the said circumstance? If no, the circumstance is integral. If yes, the 
circumstance is attendant. 
Justice Brennan applied his reasoning to the offence of importing a 
‘prohibited import’ contrary to section 233B(1), and found that: 
Importing simpliciter is not an act nor is it defined to be a prohibited act in par. 
(b). Importing narcotic goods is an act; it is the act referred to in par. (b). The 
character of the act involved in the offence depends on the nature of the object 
imported. The paragraph thus impliedly requires an intent to do the prohibited act 
– importing narcotic goods – and thus requires knowledge of the nature of the 
object imported. It is impossible to divide the act involved in an offence under par. 
(b) into an act and circumstances attendant on its occurrence. The external 
elements of an offence under par. (b), unlike the offence considered in Reynhoudt, 
cannot be divided. An intention ‘to do the whole act that is prohibited’ – the view 
of Dixon CJ in Reynhoudt – is, in my opinion, the only view which the language 
of par. (b) permits.91 
Following Brennan J, we suggest that where a circumstance is integral to the 
act, the relevant mens rea should be knowledge. If the circumstance is attendant 
to the act, while there is a presumption of knowledge, the corresponding fault 
element may be interpreted as strict or absolute – if this is more consonant with 
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the purpose of the Act taking into account the words of the statute; the subject 
matter with which the statute deals; and the utility of imposing strict liability.92 
As we will explain below, this analysis has important implications for 
clarifying the elements of the offences defined by sections 4 and 4A of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). 
 
B   Construing Offensive Language and Conduct: The Case Law 
Applying this methodology to sections 4 and 4A of the Summary Offences 
Act 1988 (NSW), the actus reus may be broken down into three elements; a 
conduct component and two circumstance components: 
• conduct or language (the act/conduct); 
• the conduct or language is offensive (the first circumstance); and 
• the conduct was in or near or within view or hearing from a public place 
or school or that the speech was in or near or within hearing from a 
public place or school – referred to in this article as the ‘proximity’ 
requirement (the second circumstance). 
We note that this distinction – between the two different circumstance 
components in the definition of offensive conduct and language – is often glossed 
in the case law and academic commentary.93 
In relation to the first circumstance, following Brennan J in He Kaw Teh, we 
argue that it is the offensive nature of the act (conduct or speech), which gives it 
its criminal character. Offensiveness is an essential precondition of the act 
potentially attracting the attention of the criminal law. As such, we take the view 
that the circumstance of ‘offensive’ is integral to the act – it not being possible to 
divide the conduct involved in the offence into an act and circumstance attendant 
on its occurrence. By contrast, the second circumstance – proximity – may be 
viewed as a circumstance attendant on the occurrence of the act. 
We argue this because whether or not the conduct or language was offensive 
is the primary determinant of the criminality of behaviour – hence the 
categorisation of this element as integral. However, whether or not the conduct or 
language could be seen in or heard from a public place is a secondary 
consideration which goes to the desirability, utility and practicality of holding the 
accused to account for his or her breach of society’s offensiveness standard. 
While it is a necessary element of the offence it does not go to the heart of the 
accused’s culpability. It follows that proximity is appropriately characterised as 
an attendant circumstance. 
Thus, the actus reus of the offences defined by sections 4 and 4A are: speech 
or conduct committed voluntarily (act/conduct); offensiveness (integral 
circumstance); and relevant proximity to or in a public place (attendant 
circumstance). Later in this article, we will consider the consequences of our 
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proffered categorisation of actus reus components for how we view the 
correlating mens rea. 
 
1 The Act: Conduct or Speech 
The first element to be proved is that the person engages in either conduct 
(behaviour) or speech (language or words). As the case law demonstrates, there is 
an enormous variety of conduct or speech that may potentially fall within this 
aspect of the actus reus. For example, it may include wearing a t-shirt that 
includes swear words (‘Too Drunk To Fuck’),94 climbing onto a pedestal of a 
statue and hanging a political placard over it (‘I will not fight in Vietnam’),95 as 
well as the more garden variety cases involving a person swearing, typically at a 
police officer, in a public place.96 
As with any conduct/act component of the actus reus, it must be committed 
voluntarily.97 
 
2 Circumstance One: ‘Offensiveness’ 
‘Offensiveness’ is not defined in the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) but 
its meaning has been developed through the case law. Although, as discussed in 
Part III of this article, concerns have been raised about how the test of 
offensiveness is applied in particular circumstances, the preferred interpretation 
of this element of the offences defined by sections 4 and 4A has been well 
canvassed in the case law, and clearly explained in the academic commentary.98 
For the sake of completeness, and before moving onto the key remaining area of 
uncertainty – the fault elements for offensive conduct/language – we will 
summarise the guidance that has been provided by the case law. 
 
(a) Objective Test of the Reasonable Person 
It is well settled that the test for whether something is ‘offensive’ is an 
objective one of the reasonable person. It has been said that something is 
offensive if it is 
such as is calculated to wound the feelings, or arouse anger, resentment, disgust, 
or outrage in the mind of a reasonable man, notwithstanding that no member of 
the public is present, or (if there be members of the public present) that nobody is 
offended …99 
The reasonable person is said to be ‘reasonably tolerant and understanding, 
and reasonably contemporary in his reactions’.100 As a result, it is not necessary 
for the prosecution to prove that a particular person was in fact offended, 
                                                 
94  Police v Pfeifer (1997) 68 SASR 285 (‘Pfeifer’). 
95  Ball v McIntyre (1966) 9 FLR 237. 
96  See, eg, Police v Butler [2003] NSWLC 2; Jolly v R (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 225. 
97  Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205, 213 (Barwick CJ); He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 523, 568 
(Brennan J). 
98  See, eg, Brown et al, above n 2, 755–63. 
99  Inglis v Fish [1961] VR 607, 611 (Pape J). See also Spears, Quilter and Harfield, above n 4, 155.   
100  Ball v McIntyre (1966) 9 FLR 237, 245 (Kerr J). 
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although such evidence is admissible and, indeed, it may be difficult to prove the 
offence without it.101 
This does not, however, mean that the context (including how words were 
spoken, the time of day or night, or whether the offence occurred after police 
entered a highly charged environment) and potential audience are irrelevant in 
determining whether something is objectively offensive.102 Something done or 
said in one context (such as a pub) may not be offensive, but if done in another 
may well be so (such as in a playground with young children about). 
 
(b) Changing Community Standards 
What is objectively offensive may also change over time with changes in 
community standards. This is particularly apparent with swear words such as 
‘fuck’.103 
 
3 Circumstance Two: Proximity  
We are of the view that the second circumstance, which requires that the 
offensive language or conduct be committed in or with some proximity to a 
public place, is an attendant circumstance. The required proximity to, and the 
concept of, ‘public place’ are discussed separately below. 
Under section 4 the offensive conduct must be committed ‘in or near, or 
within view or hearing from, a public place or a school’, whereas for an offensive 
language charge under s 4A the language must be used ‘in or near, or within 
hearing from, a public place or a school’. 
The meaning of ‘public place’ is exclusively defined in section 3(1) of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) as: 
(a)  a place (whether or not covered by water), or 
(b) a part of premises, 
that is open to the public, or is used by the public whether or not on payment of 
money or other consideration, whether or not the place or part is ordinarily so 
open or used and whether or not the public to whom it is open consists only of a 
limited class of persons, but does not include a school. 
This statutory definition104 is broad and focuses on whether the public use or 
go to the place, regardless of whether it is a private premises or only a small 
number or class of persons use the place.105 
                                                 
101  Connolly v Willis [1984] 1 NSWLR 373, 384 (Wood J). 
102  Hortin v Rowbottom (1993) 61 SASR 313, 322 (Mullighan J); Connolly v Willis [1984] 1 NSWLR 373, 
379 (Wood J); See also Spears, Quilter and Harfield, above n 4, 156. 
103  Police v Butler [2003] NSWLC 2, [6], [22], [34], [37] (Magistrate Heilpern); David Heilpern, ‘Police v 
Shannon Thomas Dunn, Dubbo Local Court’ (1999) 24 Alternative Law Journal 238. See also Brown et 
al, above n 2, 755–60; New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 47, 297–9. 
104  The definition in s 3(3) expressly excludes the definition of public place in s 8 of the Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW). It is noted that there are separate definitions of ‘premises’, ‘school’ and ‘vehicle’ in s 3(1); see 
also s 3(2). 
105  Re Camp [1975] 1 NSWLR 452, 454 (The Court); McIvor v Garlick [1972] VR 129, 133–6 (Newton J). 
For further discussion of the significant case law on what may constitute a public place, see Spears, 
Quilter and Harfield, above n 4, 164–5. 




There is no requirement that a person be in the public place at the time the 
offence is committed.106 This is because of the ‘protective’ purpose of the 
legislation: the public should know they are protected from offensive language in 
public or within hearing of such places.107 
 
4 Mens Rea 
As discussed above, offensive conduct or language charges involve three 
actus reus components: an act/conduct (speech or behaviour) and two 
circumstance components (the conduct or language is offensive and the conduct 
or language is in or within the required proximity to a public place). While the 
case law discussed above does not break the offences down in this way, there is 
sufficient judicial consideration of each of these conduct elements to provide 
relevant guidance. The same cannot be said about mens rea. 
In spite of the frequency with which offensive conduct and language charges 
are laid or penalty notices issued, the law regarding the mens rea for these 
offences is unsettled. Part of the problem lies in the paucity of NSW appellate 
authority on the issue.108 In addition, the authorities that are available, whether 
from NSW or other Australian jurisdictions, tend to conflate what should be 
discrete questions about the fault element (if any) that attaches to each 
component of the actus reus into a global inquiry as to whether the offence is one 
of mens rea.109 Consistent with the principles laid down in He Kaw Teh, we argue 
that a more nuanced approach is required; one that identifies what, if any, mental 
state applies to each component of the actus reus. It is for this reason that we 
have considered in detail above how the conduct elements of offensive conduct 
and language should be construed. This is an essential first step in order to be 
able to assess what, if any, correlating fault component should be regarded as 
constituting an element of the crime. 
 
(a) Mens Rea as to Conduct 
The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has never effectively considered the 
question of the mens rea for the offences defined by sections 4 and 4A of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). The only relevant guidance comes from a 
very small number of cases stated to single judges of the Supreme Court of NSW 
on appeal from the Local Court. In the one reported decision,110 Jeffs v 
Graham,111 Yeldham J considered an appeal against an offensive conduct 
conviction under the predecessor legislation to sections 4 and 4A of the Summary 
                                                 
106  Stutsel v Reid (1990) 20 NSWLR 661, 663 (Loveday J). The presence or absence of a person in the place 
may, however, be relevant to penalty. 
107  Ibid 664 (Loveday J); see Jolly v R (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 225, 230 [22] (Cogswell DCJ). 
108  Brown et al, above n 2, 763–9. 
109  See, eg, Jeffs v Graham (1987) 8 NSWLR 292; Pregelj (1987) 88 FLR 346; Pfeifer (1997) 68 SASR 285. 
Each of these cases is discussed below. 
110  See also Patterson v Alsleben (Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court, Newman JA, 5 June 1990); 
Dennis, above n 13, 8–9. 
111  (1987) 8 NSWLR 292. 
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Offences Act 1988 (NSW), namely section 5 of the Offences in Public Places Act 
1979 (NSW). The phrase ‘shall not conduct himself or herself’ (a phrase not 
relevantly different to the wording of sections 4 and 4A: ‘must not conduct 
himself or herself’ and ‘must not use offensive language’) was held to ‘require at 
least that there should be a voluntary act by the person charged.’112 Justice 
Yeldham ruled that the offence ‘does at least require the Crown to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the person charged had voluntarily engaged in the conduct 
complained of.’113 It appears that the term ‘voluntary’ may have been used here 
as a synonym for intentional, but Yeldham J only seemed to require this mens rea 
in respect of the act/conduct component of the actus reus. In other words, the 
prosecution must prove that the accused intended to speak (in the case of 
offensive language) or behave intentionally (in the case of offensive conduct). 
This is of course a very minimal requirement and would rarely be in issue. The 
question of mens rea in relation to what we have identified as the two 
circumstance components of the actus reus for offensive conduct and offensive 
language offences was not considered in Jeffs v Graham.114 The resulting 
ambiguity is one of the consequences of the traditional tendency not to subject 
public order offences to the same sort of precise technical scrutiny and exegesis 
that is commonplace in relation to more serious crimes. 
The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has not considered the question, and so 
it appears to remain an open question as to whether mens rea is required for the 
two circumstance components. Below we discuss the two primary but conflicting 
interstate authorities dealing with mens rea in offensive language and behaviour 
offences. 
 
(b) Offensiveness: Strict Liability vs Intent 
The issue of whether the circumstance of ‘offensiveness’ requires a mens rea 
element was considered in the South Australian case of Pfeifer.115 Pfeifer was 
charged with behaving in an offensive manner contrary to section 7(1)(a) of the 
Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) for wearing a T-shirt (given to him by his 
mother) in a shopping mall, with the name of the band ‘Dead Kennedys’ and the 
words ‘Too Drunk To Fuck’. In considering whether the offence required a 
mental element, applying He Kaw Teh, Doyle CJ (Debelle and Lander JJ 
agreeing) held that the presumption of mens rea had been rebutted and that the 
offence was one of strict liability. Thus, the prosecution must prove that the 
relevant conduct is offensive and that the person did not honestly and reasonably 
believe that the conduct was not offensive. Chief Justice Doyle held: 
                                                 
112  Ibid 295. 
113  Ibid 296. 
114  The Supreme Court considered the question again in Patterson v Alsleben (Unreported, New South Wales 
Supreme Court, Newman JA, 5 June 1990), but Newman JA appears primarily to have adopted the 
ambiguous terminology used by Yeldham J (‘voluntary’ when presumably intentional is meant), and 
failed to differentiate between the different actus reus components in relation to which He Kaw Teh 
requires discrete fault element inquiries to be made. 
115  (1997) 68 SASR 285. 




It appears to me to be a provision intended to protect members of society from 
disturbance and annoyance through offensive behaviour, intended to prevent the 
sort of disputes and disturbances that might arise if such behaviour is not 
prevented by law with the consequence that members of society react to it or resist 
it in other ways. To convict only those who intentionally or knowingly offend will 
achieve a good deal, but does not go that extra step of requiring members of 
society to take care to ensure that they do not breach generally accepted standards 
of behaviour.116 
Pfeifer was applied in Police v Rosser117 and affirmed in Police v Atherton.118 
In South Australia, therefore, it would appear to be established that this offence 
(or more precisely the element of offensiveness) is one of strict liability. 
It is important to note that the offence in South Australia differs from the 
NSW provision, in respect of the second circumstance relating to location or 
proximity. The South Australian offence requires that the person is in a public 
place whereas the NSW provision is broader capturing conduct committed within 
the relevant proximity to a public place (the second circumstance). We would 
argue, therefore, that Doyle CJ has only addressed the circumstance element of 
‘offensiveness’, finding it to be a strict liability component. 
In Pregelj, the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal construed a 
provision more similar to the offences defined by section 4 of the Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW).119 Section 47(a) of the Summary Offences Act (NT), 
relevantly, makes it an offence to engage in ‘offensive … behaviour … in or 
within the hearing or view of any person in any … public place’. In this case, a 
police officer was walking along a foot-lane at approximately 8.50pm, when he 
saw through a lit bedroom window a naked white man having sexual intercourse 
on the floor of the room with a naked Aboriginal female. The facts indicate that 
the house was seven or eight metres from the lane; there was a one metre fence 
separating the lane from the house; and the bottom of the window was close to 
the floor. Justice Nader concluded that ‘there was evidence, to be inferred from 
each of them [the appellants] saying that they thought they were out of sight 
behind a wall (to which I have referred), that the appellants did give thought to 
the possibility of being seen from outside the house.’120 
By contrast to the decision in Pfeifer, the Court (Nader, Kearney and Rice JJ) 
held that the offence is one of mens rea. While the separate judgments of Nader 
and Rice JJ (Kearney J concurring with the orders of Nader J) do not expressly 
articulate their conclusions in these terms, we would argue that each focuses on a 
different circumstance component in coming to their findings. 
On the one hand, Nader J, after applying He Kaw Teh, appears to focus on 
the circumstance of ‘offensiveness’ stating that ‘offensive behaviour’ requires 
that the accused intended to offend: 
  
                                                 
116  Ibid 292. 
117  (2008) 185 A Crim R 305. 
118  [2010] SASC 87, [15] (Duggan J). 
119  (1987) 88 FLR 346. 
120  Ibid 349 (Nader J). 
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The gravamen of offensive behaviour is the offending of another person, and the 
offending must be intended … having taken precautions to conceal themselves, 
they did not intend to offend, nor did they foresee the possibility of offending 
anyone. By ‘intent to offend’, I mean ‘do an act with knowledge that the activity 
would, or at least could, offend’.121 
On the other hand, Rice J, having found that the act of sexual intercourse per 
se could not be said to be offensive but was rather a ‘natural and lawful human 
behaviour’, focused on the second circumstance, ‘within the view of any 
person’.122 Thus, Rice J held that section 47 was only intended to proscribe 
sexual intercourse in circumstances where the conduct was intended to be viewed 
by others. This imports an element of ‘prurience’ into the conduct.123 
 
C   A Suggested Approach to Mens Rea in NSW 
The above discussion indicates that while it is clear that under sections 4 and 
4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) there must be an intent to perform 
the relevant conduct, it is an open question as to what, if any, mental state applies 
to the two circumstance components of the actus reus: offensiveness and 
proximity. The South Australian decision of Pfeifer points in the direction of the 
circumstance of ‘offensiveness’ being a strict liability component, whereas 
Justice Nader’s decision in Pregelj points in the opposite direction, indicating 
that it requires an intent to offend – meaning knowledge (or recklessness) that the 
relevant conduct is offensive. In terms of the circumstance of proximity, Pfeifer 
provides no guidance and Justice Rice’s judgment in Pregelj points to a 
requirement that the Crown must prove that the accused intended to be in, within 
view or hearing of a public place whilst performing the relevant conduct. 
In the absence of judicial guidance in NSW, and given the conflicting nature 
of the authority from South Australia and the Northern Territory, we venture our 
own interpretation of the corresponding mens rea elements as follows (drawing 
on Justice Brennan’s distinction in He Kaw Teh between circumstances that are 
integral and those that are attendant to the act). 
First, following Jeffs v Graham there must be an intention to perform the 
act/conduct. This component seems settled. 
Secondly, as argued above, we regard the first circumstance – ‘offensiveness’ 
– as integral to the act. Clearly, the mere act of speaking or engaging in some 
form of conduct is not what is prohibited by sections 4 and 4A. Rather, it is only 
when the speech or conduct (the act) has the attribute of being offensive (the 
integral circumstance) that the speech or conduct might, assuming all other 
elements are satisfied, be regarded as criminal in character. In our view, 
therefore, it is not possible to divide the core conduct element into an act and a 
circumstance attendant on its occurrence. This appears to have been the 
conclusion reached by Nader J in Pregelj: 
  
                                                 
121  Ibid 360–1. 
122  Ibid 367. 
123  Ibid 368. 




Behaviour that does not offend, at least potentially, cannot be offensive. 
Behaviour, offensive in other circumstances, committed in complete privacy 
cannot be offensive. It cannot be in the nature of any conduct to be offensive 
without including in the definition of the conduct the circumstances which render 
it offensive. Therefore, on one view of it, the offending of a person, actually or 
potentially, is an integral element of the proscribed conduct.124  
Following Justice Brennan’s approach in He Kaw Teh – that an integral 
circumstance component of the actus reus of an offence attracts the same mens 
rea presumption as the physical act component (discussed above) – we argue that 
a charge under sections 4 or 4A should not be regarded as made out unless there 
is evidence of an intention to do the whole act – being the physical act plus the 
integral circumstance. It follows that it is an element of the offences defined by 
sections 4 and 4A that the accused knew – or foresaw that it was possible (that is, 
was reckless) – that the conduct or language was offensive. 
This conclusion is supported not only by an application of the 
integral/attendant circumstance distinction embraced by Brennan J in He Kaw 
Teh, but via reasoning from the ‘first principles’ approach to identifying the fault 
element(s) of a statutory offence, including the presumption of mens rea for 
which He Kaw Teh still stands as Australia’s leading authority. Thus, the word 
‘offensive’ has been defined in the case law (discussed above) as ‘such as is 
calculated to wound the feelings, or arouse anger, resentment, disgust, or outrage 
in the mind of a reasonable man.’125 The word ‘calculated’ imports the notion of 
intention.126 Therefore, we argue that there is a necessary implication that the 
word ‘offensive’ connotes mens rea. 
We conclude127 this even though there are a number of other offences 
contained in part 2 division 1 (in which sections 4 and 4A fall), which expressly 
provide for a mens rea requirement (‘wilfully’ being used in sections 5 (‘obscene 
exposure’), 6 (‘obstructing traffic’), 7 (‘damaging fountains’), and 8(2) 
(‘damaging or desecrating protected places’)) while sections 4 and 4A are silent 
on the question.128 Furthermore, our conclusion that mens rea is required for the 
circumstance of ‘offensiveness’ is not swayed by the availability in sections 4(3) 
and 4A(2) of a defence of ‘reasonable excuse for conducting himself or herself in 
the manner alleged’. Certainly the presence of a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence is 
relevant to the statutory construction exercise, but it is not determinative. As 
Yeldham J held in Jeffs v Graham, the provision of a defence of ‘reasonable 
                                                 
124  Ibid 360. 
125  Inglis v Fish [1961] VR 607, 611 (Pape J) (emphasis added). See also Spears, Quilter and Harfield, above 
n 4, 155. 
126  See also Dennis, above n 13, 4, 8. 
127  Justice Yeldham came to a similar conclusion in Jeffs v Graham (1987) 8 NSWLR 292, 295. 
128  The offences contained in ss 6A (‘unauthorised entry of vehicle or boat’), 8A (‘climbing on or jumping 
from buildings and other structures’), 9 (‘continuation of intoxicated and disorderly behaviour following 
move on direction’), 11 (‘possession of liquor by minors’) and 11A (‘violent disorder’) are also silent as 
to mens rea. 
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excuse’ is not ‘an indication’ that the prosecution does not bear the onus of 
proving mens rea.129 
While the subject matter, particularly in terms of penalty (which is at the 
lesser end of the spectrum of criminal penalties), may point towards a rebuttal of 
the presumption, the final test of the utility of imposing strict liability in our view 
does not. Both Pregelj and Pfeifer demonstrate that a strict liability standard 
would carry a real risk that ‘luckless’ persons – that is, those ‘who unwittingly 
engage in prohibited conduct’130 (such as two adults engaged in consensual 
sexual activity in their home131 or a young man wearing a t-shirt that was a 
birthday gift from his mother, carrying the name of a song by one of his favourite 
bands) could be caught by the offence. As the quote above from Brennan J in He 
Kaw Teh suggests, the utility test goes to the general fairness in the operation of 
the law: ‘[t]he requirement of mens rea is at once a reflection of the purpose of 
the statute and a humane protection for persons who unwittingly engage in 
prohibited conduct.’132 
Furthermore, the broader context of the potential unfairness that surrounds 
the operation of offensive conduct and offensive language laws (discussed in Part 
III of this article) provides additional support for the conclusion that rebuttal of 
the presumption in favour of mens rea is not justified. 
Finally, as to the actus reus element of proximity, we have argued above that 
it should be regarded as a circumstance attendant upon the act; not integral to it.  
Justice Brennan held in He Kaw Teh that the strong presumption in favour of 
mens rea for an integral circumstance element is weaker in the case of an 
attendant circumstance.133 However, it is still necessary to determine whether the 
(weaker) presumption should be regarded as rebutted, taking into account the 
words of the statute, the subject matter, and the utility of imposing strict liability. 
Our conclusion is that this aspect of the actus reus – ie the proximity 
requirement – for the offences defined by sections 4 and 4A involves strict 
liability. There is nothing in the words or subject matter of the offences that 
suggest that knowledge is required in relation to this element and the utility of a 
strict liability reading is evident. It will generally be within the power of an 
individual to take reasonable steps to determine whether their conduct or 
language is taking place in or near or within view or hearing of a public place or 
school. That is, the protective purpose of the legislation is advanced by creating 
an obligation on individuals to take reasonable care in relation to proximity. 
Arguably, a potentially ‘luckless’ accused in relation to this circumstance134 may 
be able to utilise the reasonable excuse defence for so conducting himself or 
herself under sections 4(3) or 4A(2). 
                                                 
129  Jeffs v Graham (1987) 8 NSWLR 292, 295. 
130  He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 523, 567–8. 
131  And who were not aware they could be seen from outside and who had made an effort to position the rug 
on which they were lying accordingly.  
132  He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 523, 568 (emphasis added). 
133  Ibid 575–6. 
134  For instance, such as in Pregelj, where the accused thought they had taken steps not to be seen. 




Drawing a different conclusion as to the fault element that attaches to two 
different circumstance components may be regarded as unusual. However, it 
would be a mistake to assume that all circumstance elements should be 
considered as of equal significance to the criminality of the conduct in question. 
As we argued above, the offensiveness and proximity elements of the offences 
defined by sections 4 and 4A play different roles in establishing the boundaries 
of the proscribed conduct. The ‘reading in’ of two different fault elements in 
relation to two different circumstance components is clearly contemplated by 
Justice Brennan’s analysis in He Kaw Teh and is, in our view, a justifiable and 
appropriate conclusion in relation to the crimes of offensive conduct and 
offensive language.135 
 
V   CONCLUSION 
Granted, the manner in which the offences defined by sections 4 and 4A of 
the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) are enforced – CINs and high volume 
guilty pleas in the Local Court – affords relatively limited opportunities for 
detailed judicial examination. Nonetheless, we have argued in this article that it is 
unacceptable that, for two crimes that are enforced more than 12 000 times each 
year in NSW, frequently in controversial circumstances, it remains unclear what 
the elements of the crimes are. Clarification would be welcome in a number of 
quarters. First, students in criminal law courses and practising criminal lawyers 
would not be left to grapple with the applicability of the opaque discussion of the 
elements of offensive conduct by the NSW Supreme Court,136 and to extrapolate 
from appellate rulings on comparable (but not identical) offences in the Northern 
Territory137 and South Australia.138 Secondly, and more importantly, as 
recognised recently by the NSW Ombudsman and the NSW Law Reform 
Commission,139 police officers who make critical decisions every day about the 
scope of sections 4 and 4A, and their applicability to behaviour they encounter, 
would receive much needed guidance. The guidance they currently receive is 
                                                 
135  Note that the equivalent provision in the Tasmanian Police Offences Act 1935 has expressly provided for 
different fault elements in relation to the two circumstances of offensiveness and proximity:  
  21 Prohibited behaviour  
  A person must not, wilfully and without reasonable excuse, do any act or behave in a manner that a reasonable 
person is likely to find indecent or offensive in all the circumstances, if that person knew or should have known 
that his or her conduct was being, or may have been, viewed by another person.   
  Penalty:  
  Fine not exceeding 50 penalty units or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or both.  
 Thus, s 21 requires that the accused wilfully act in an offensive manner (the offensiveness circumstance) 
while requiring either that he or she knew or should have known that the conduct could be viewed (the 
circumstance of proximity). 
136  Jeffs v Graham (1987) 8 NSWLR 292. 
137  Pregelj (1987) 88 FLR 346. 
138  Pfeifer (1997) 68 SASR 285. 
139  See above Part III. 
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demonstrably inadequate, producing real risks of over-policing and over-
criminalisation. We believe this situation is untenable and ought to be challenged 
and resolved. Finally, and most importantly, individuals stung by the harshness 
and possible unfairness of a penalty notice or charge for allegedly breaching 
sections 4 or 4A would, with the benefit of a clear and comprehensive 
articulation of the elements of the offence, have the option (not easily exercised, 
we concede) of contesting the police assertion that their conduct or language was 
criminal. Everyone who faces the prospect of criminal punishment should be 
given this opportunity. Even those charged with ‘trivial’ crimes. 
 
